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Abstract
We study the gain of an insider having private information which concerns the default
risk of a counterparty. More precisely, the default time τ is modelled as the first time a
stochastic process hits a random barrier L. The insider knows this barrier (as it can be
the case for example for the manager of the counterparty), whereas standard investors only
observe its value at the default time. All investors aim to maximize the expected utility from
terminal wealth, on a financial market where the risky asset price is exposed to a sudden
loss at the default time of the counterparty. In this framework, the insider’s information is
modelled by using an initial enlargement of filtration and τ is a stopping time with respect
to this enlarged filtration. We prove that the regulator must impose short selling constraints
for the insider, in order to exclude the value process to reach infinity. We then solve the
optimization problem and we study the gain of the insider, theoretically and numerically.
In general, the insider achieves a larger value of expected utility than the standard investor.
But in extreme situations for the default and loss risks, a standard investor may in average
outperform the insider, by taking advantage of an aggressive short selling position which is
not allowed for the insider, but at the risk of big losses if the default finally occurs after the
maturity.
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1 Introduction
The insider’s optimal investment is a classical problem where an investor possessing some extra
flow of information aims to maximize the expected utility on the final value of her portfolio. As
the insider has more information, she has access to a larger set of available trading strategies,
leading to a higher expected utility from terminal wealth. In the literature, an interesting
question has been studied: what is the cost of the extra information? From an indifference
point of view, we search for the value at which the investor accepts to buy the information at
the initial time, that is, the amount of money she is ready to pay such that this cost is offset by
the increase of the maximal expected utility. This is the approach adopted by Amendinger et
al. [1], where the authors study the value of an initial information in the setting of a complete
default free market. The extra information they consider is a terminal information distorted
by an independent noise, for example, a noisy signal of a functional of the final value of the
assets. We adopt a more direct manner: we are interested in the gain of the insider from her
investment strategy on the portfolio compared to other investors not having access to the extra
information. The originality of our paper is to study this problem in the context of credit risks:
the insider’s information concerns the default risk of a counterparty firm.
During the financial crisis, the counterparty default has become an important source of
risk we need to take into account. Jiao and Pham [14] have considered an optimal investment
problem where the risky asset in the portfolio is subjected to the default risk of a counterparty
firm and its value may suffer a sudden loss at the counterparty default time τ . This paper is
a good benchmark in our study in order to quantify the value of the extra information. The
accessible information for a standard investor is described as in the classical credit risk modelling
by Bielecki and Rutkowski [4], using the progressive enlargement of a reference “default-free”
filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 by the default τ . To analyze the impact of default, the default density
framework developed in El Karoui et al. [5] has been adopted.
This current paper concentrates on an insider in comparison with a standard investor. Both
agents can invest in the same risk-free asset and risky one and they observe the same market
price for each asset. However, the insider possesses more information on the risky asset since it is
influenced by the counterparty default on which the insider has additional knowledge. Due to the
extra information, the insider may gain larger profit. The insider’s information is modelled by
using an initial enlargement of filtration as in [1] and in Grorud and Pontier [7]. More precisely,
in the credit risk context, we model the default time τ as the first time that a stochastic process
hits a random barrier L. The insider knows the barrier from the initial time and the other
investors only see its value at the default time. This extra information is called the insider’s
information, or the full information in Hillairet and Jiao [9].
We shall consider the insider’s optimization problem in parallel with the one studied in [14].
The canonical decomposition of processes adapted to the enlarged filtration induces to specify
the investment strategies on the two sets: before-default one {t < τ} and after-default one
{t ≥ τ}, which is a similar point to [14]. However, due to the extra knowledge on the default
barrier L, the insider’s strategy depends on L before the counterparty default, which is not
the case for the standard investor. If the default occurs, the insider’s strategy will depend on
the default time τ . From the methodology point of view, the main difference here is that for
the insider, the default time is modelled as in the classical structural approach model since the
random barrier L is known, so that τ becomes a stopping time w.r.t. the reference filtration F.
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Therefore, the default density hypothesis, which is crucial in [14], fails to hold for the insider
and we can no longer adopt the conditional density approach in this situation. We apply the
theory of initial enlargement of filtration, assuming that the conditional law of L given Ft is
equivalent to the law of L. The corresponding Radon Nikodym derivative process, (pt(.), t ≥ 0)
will play a key role in our methodology.
The main observation of our study is that, if the short-selling is not regulated, then the
insider can obtain unbounded terminal wealth. This justifies the necessity to consider the
optimization problem with portfolio strategies where the short-selling is limited to a given level.
We decompose the optimization problem as an after-default problem and a global before-default
one, that we solve respectively by using the dual and the dynamic programming methods. To
make comparison with the standard investor in [14], we choose to consider CRRA utility function.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model for the counterparty
default, and we define and compare the informational structure of an insider with respect to a
standard investor. In Section 3 we present the insider’s investment problem and we decompose
it into an after-default and global before-default ones, using the Radon Nikodym derivative
process. We also prove the necessity of imposing short selling constraint for the insider to
exclude the value process to reach infinity. In Section 4 we solve the two optimization problems:
the after-default one through duality methods in a default free complete market, and the global
before-default one through dynamic programming approach. We perform theorical comparison
of the value process of the after-default optimization problem, and for the global before-default
optimization problem, the comparison is done in Section 5 through numerical illustrations.
2 Counterparty default model and information
We first introduce the model for the counterparty default, which is a general and standard
model in the credit risk analysis. Let us fix a probability space (Ω,A,P) equipped with a
reference filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 satisfying the usual conditions, which represents the “default-
free” information. Let τ be a positive random time denoting the default time of the counterparty,
which is not necessarily an F-stopping time.
• The default model
We consider the default risk of the counterparty in a general barrier model. Let (λt, t ≥ 0)
be a positive F-adapted process representing the default intensity process of the counterparty.
Denote by Λt =
∫ t
0 λsds. It is an increasing process. We model the default time as the first
passage time of the process Λ to a positive random barrier L, i.e.
(2.1) τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Λt ≥ L}
where the default threshold L is a positive A-measurable random variable. In the particular but
widely used case of Cox process model, L is independent of F∞ and follows the uni-exponential
law. In the case where L is constant or deterministic, τ is an F-stopping time as in the classical
structural default models.
• Information of the insider
We suppose that, besides the information on the “default-free” market, the insider has
complete information on L: this is the case for example of the counterparty firm’s managers who
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determine the default threshold. This full information is modelled as the initial enlargement of
the filtration F by L and denoted by GM = (GMt )t≥0, G
M
t = Ft∨σ(L). Without loss of generality,
we assume that all the filtrations we deal with in the following satisfy the usual conditions.
We suppose that a standard investor on the market observes whether the default has occurred
or not and if so, the default time τ , together with the information contained in the filtration F.
Mathematically, this information is represented by the progressive enlargement of filtration F
by τ , or more precisely, by the filtration G = (Gt)t≥0 where Gt = Ft ∨ Dt, Dt = σ(1τ≤s, s ≤ t).
This is the standard credit risk modeling for an market investor as in [4].
The investor’s information is included in the insider’s information flow. We have Gt ⊆ G
M
t
for any t ≥ 0. In fact, before the default τ , i.e., on the set {t < τ}, the insider has additional
information on L, so her information GMt is in general strictly larger than Gt. After the default
occurs, both of them observe the default event and subsequently the value of L so that they
have equal information flow.
We recall the canonical decomposition of GM -adapted (respectively GM -predictable) pro-
cesses (see Jeulin [13] Lemma 3.13 and 4.4).
Lemma 2.1 1. For t ≥ 0, any GMt -measurable random variable can be written in the form
Yt = 1τ>tY
0
t (L) + 1τ≤tY
1
t (τ) where Y
0
t (·) and Y
1
t (·) are Ft ⊗ B(R+)-measurable.
2. Any GM -adapted process Y admits the decomposition form Yt = 1τ>tY
0
t (L) + 1τ≤tY
1
t (τ)
where Y 0(·) and Y 1(·) are F⊗ B(R+)-adapted
1.
3. Any GM -predictable process Y admits the decomposition form Yt = 1τ≥tY
0
t (L)+1τ<tY
1
t (τ)
where Y 0(·) and Y 1(·) are P(F)⊗B(R+)-measurable, P(F) being the predictable σ-algebra
associated with the filtration F.
Remark 2.2 To compare with the case of a standard investor, we recall that any Gt-measurable
random variable Zt can be written as Zt = 1τ>tZ
0
t + 1τ≤tZ
1
t (τ) where Z
0
t and Z
1
t (·) are respec-
tively Ft-measurable and Ft ⊗ B(R+)-measurable.
3 Insider’s optimization problem
3.1 Portfolio investment strategy and wealth process
From now on, a finite horizon T is fixed and all investment strategies take place from time 0
to time T . The insider has access to the same financial market as the standard investor, more
precisely, she can invest in two types of financial assets. The first one is a risk-free bond with
strictly positive values. We choose it as the nume´raire and assume, without loss of generality
that the value of this bond equal to 1. The other asset is a risky one which is affected by default
risk of the counterparty firm on which the insider has extra information.
The price of this risky asset is observable by all investors on market at any time t ∈ [0, T ].
Since it is subject to the counterparty default risk, the price process is modelled by a G-adapted
1Namely for any t ≥ 0, the function Y it (·) is Ft ⊗ B(R+)-measurable.
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process S, which admits the decomposition form
(3.1) St = S
0
t 1t<τ + S
1
t (τ)1t≥τ , 0 ≤ t ≤ T
where S0 is F-adapted and S1(·) is F ⊗ B(R+)-adapted. We suppose that the asset suffers a
contagious loss at the default time of the counterparty, that is,
S1θ (θ) = S
0
θ−(1− γθ),
and that 0 < γθ < 1 for any θ ≥ 0 so that the asset price remains strictly positive. The process
γ is F-adapted and represents the proportional loss at default.
We consider the trading strategy of the insider, who chooses to adjust the portfolio of assets
according to information accessibility. Therefore, the investment strategy process is character-
ized by a GM -predictable process pi which represents the proportion of wealth invested in the
risky asset and is of the form
pit = 1t≤τpi
0
t (L) + 1t>τpi
1
t (τ),
where pi0(·) and pi1(·) are P(F) ⊗ B(R+)-measurable processes. Starting from an initial wealth
X0 ∈ R+, the total wealth of the insider’s portfolio is then a G
M -adapted process given by
(3.2) Xt = 1t<τX
0
t (L) + 1t≥τX
1
t (τ)
where the before-default wealth process satisfies the self-financing equation
(3.3) dX0t (L) = X
0
t (L)pi
0
t (L)
dS0t
S0t
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
and after the default τ , the wealth process has a change of regime in its dynamics and satisfies
(3.4) dX1t (τ) = X
1
t (τ)pi
1
t (τ)
dS1t (τ)
S1t (τ)
, t ∈ [[τ, T ]].
At the default time, the wealth has a jump in its value. Therefore, at time τ , the initial value
of the after-default wealth process is
(3.5) X1τ (τ) = X
0
τ−(L)
(
1− pi0τ (L)γτ
)
.
We suppose that pi0τ (L)γτ < 1, so that the wealth remains strictly positive after the jump due
to the counterparty default.
We consider the following dynamics for the asset price S on before-default set {t < τ} for
S0 and on after-default set {t ≥ τ} for S1:
dS0t = S
0
t (µ
0
t dt+ σ
0
t dWt), 0 ≤ t ≤ T
dS1t (θ) = S
1
t (θ)(µ
1
t (θ)dt+ σ
1
t (θ)dWt), θ ≤ t ≤ T
where the coefficients µ0 and σ0 are F-adapted processes, µ1(θ) and σ1(θ) are F⊗B(R+)-adapted
processes, and W is an F-Brownian motion. In addition, we suppose the integrability condition∫ T
0
∣∣∣µ0t
σ0t
∣∣∣2dt+ ∫ T
θ
∣∣∣µ1t (θ)
σ1t (θ)
∣∣∣2dt+ ∫ T
0
|σ0t |
2dt+
∫ T
θ
|σ1t (θ)|
2dt <∞.
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So the values of the before-default and after-default wealth satisfy the dynamics
dX0t (L) = X
0
t (L)pi
0
t (L)(µ
0
t dt+ σ
0
t dWt), 0 ≤ t ≤ T(3.6)
dX1t (τ) = X
1
t (τ)pi
1
t (τ)(µ
1
t (τ)dt+ σ
1
t (τ)dWt), t ∈ [[τ, T ]](3.7)
and the jump at default of the wealth process is given by the equality (3.5). Finally, we define
the admissible trading strategy family AL as the set of pairs (pi
0(·), pi1(·)), where pi0(·) and pi1(·)
are P(F) ⊗B(R+)-measurable processes such that
(3.8) ∀ l > 0,
(∫ τl∧T
0
|pi0t (l)σ
0
t |
2dt+
∫ T
τl∧T
|pi1t (τl)σ
1
t (τl)|
2dt
)
<∞ and pi0τl(l)γτl < 1, a.s.,
where τl is the F-stopping time defined by τl := inf{t : Λt ≥ l}.
Remark 3.1 Let A denote the set of all GM -predictable processes pi such that
∫ T
0 |pitσt|
2dt <∞
and piτγτ < 1. If (pi
0(·), pi1(·)) is an element in AL, then (pit = pi
0
t (L)1τ≥t+pi
1
t (τL)1τ<t, t ≥ 0) is a
processus in the set A. Conversly, given a process pi ∈ A, there exists a pair (pi0(·), pi1(·)) ∈ AL
such that pit = pi
0
t (L)1τ≥t + pi
1
t (τL)1τ<t for any t ≥ 0, thanks to Lemma 2.1.
3.2 The optimization problem
The insider has the objective to maximize her expected utility function on the terminal wealth of
the portfolio. Let U be a utility function defined on (0,+∞), strictly increasing, strictly concave
and of class C1 on (0,+∞), and satisfying limx→0+ U
′(x) = +∞ and limx→∞U
′(x) = 0.
We shall consider the problem
(3.9) V0 = sup
pi∈AL
E[U(XT )]
and search for the optimal strategy pi for the insider. A similar problem has been studied in
[14] for a standard investor with G-predictable strategy pi = (pi0, pi1(·)) and G-adapted wealth
X = (X
0
,X
1
(·)). The admissible strategy set A consists of pairs pi = (pi0, pi1(·)) where pi0 and
pi1(·) are respectively F-predictable and P(F) ⊗ B(R+)-measurable, and such that
∀ θ ∈ R+,
∫ T
0
|pi0tσ
0
t |
2dt+
∫ T
θ
|pi1t (θ)σ
1
t (θ)|
2dt <∞ and pi0θγθ < 1, a.s.
In this paper, we concentrate on the insider’s optimization problem (3.9) and we are inter-
ested in the information flow impact on the trading strategies. Intuitively, the insider should
have a larger gain of investment due to the extra information. Indeed, if the investor and the
insider have the same utility function and if they can invest in the same financial assets, then
the only difference between them relies on their available information in the sense that the corre-
sponding filtrations satisfy G ⊂ GM , which implies the same inclusion for the sets of admissible
strategies: A ⊂ AL. Thus the corresponding value functions satisfy
(3.10) V 0 := sup
pi∈A
E[U(XT )] ≤ V0.
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since the supremum in V 0 is taken on a smaller set than the one in V0. Remark here that on
a given sample path, it may happen that U(XT ) > U(XT ) if both investor and insider follow
their optimal strategies pi and pi respectively, but one always have in expectation for optimal
strategies E[U(X
p̂i
T )] ≤ E[U(X
pi
T )].
The expectation E[U(XT )] can be written, by using the wealth decomposition formula (3.2),
as
(3.11) E[U(XT )] = E[1T<τU(X
0
T (L)) + 1T≥τU(X
1
T (τ))].
The aim of the above formulation, similar as in [14], is to reduce the initial optimization problem
in an incomplete market into two problems : the after-default and before-default ones. Nev-
ertheless, the approach we adopt here is different since, as mentioned previously, the random
time τ is not a totally inaccessible random time for the insider and we can no longer use the
conditional density approach to solve the problem.
Our approach will use the theory of initial enlargement of filtration (also called the strong
information modeling in [2]) by using the value of the random default barrier L known to the
insider. More precisely, we introduce a family of F-stopping times τl = inf{t : Λt ≥ l} for all l > 0
which are possible realizations of L and we work under an equivalent probability measure PL
under which L is independent to FT . Thus in our framework, we shall need the Radon-Nikodym
derivative process pt(L) which is the density of the historical probability measure P with respect
to this equivalent probability measure PL and it will play a similar role as the default density
process in [14].
This probability density hypothesis is given below. It is a standard hypothesis in the theory
of initial enlargement of filtration due to Jacod [11, 12].
Assumption 3.1 We assume that L is an A-measurable random variable with values in ]0,+∞[,
which satisfies the assumption :
P(L ∈ · |Ft)(ω) ∼ P(L ∈ ·), ∀t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s..
We denote by PLt (ω, dx) a regular version of the conditional law of L given Ft and by P
L the
law of L (under the probability P). According to [12], there exists a measurable version of the
conditional density
(3.12) pt(x)(ω) =
dPLt
dPL
(ω, x)
which is a positive (F,P)-martingale and hence can be written as
(3.13) pt(x) = p0(x) +
∫ t
0
ps(x)ρs(x)dWs, ∀x ∈]0,+∞[, t ∈ [0, T ]
for some F-predictable process (ρt(x))t∈[0,T ]. It is proved in [7] that Assumption 3.1 is satisfied
if and only if there exists a probability measure equivalent to P and under which FT and σ(L)
are independent. Among such equivalent probability measures, the probability PL defined by
the Radon-Nikodym derivative process
EPL
[ dP
dPL
∣∣∣GMt ] = pt(L)
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is the only one that is identical to P on F∞. For examples of L and explicit computations of
corresponding pt(L), interest reader may refer to [10].
We recall that we consider the optimization problem (3.9) V0 = suppi∈AL E[U(XT )]. Since
the initial σ-field is non-trivial, it is useful to consider the conditional optimization problem
(3.14) ess sup
pi∈AL
E[U(XT )|G
M
0 ],
where GM0 = σ(L). The link between those two optimization problems (3.9) and (3.14) is given
by [1] : if the supremum in (3.14) is attained by some strategy in AL, then the ω-wise optimum
is also a solution to (3.9). Although the supremum is not necessarily attained in our problem,
we will see in Proposition 4.12 that there exists a sequence of admissible strategies pin such
that E[U(XpinT )|G
M
0 ] converges in L
1 to (3.14) and we can prove that for the same sequence,
E[U(XpinT )] converges to V0. Thus, we will first solve the optimization problem (3.14), and then
deduce the solution of (3.9) by taking the expectation, as explained in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3.2 Under the Assumption 3.1, one has
E[U(XT )|G
M
0 ] = E
[
pT (l)
(
1T<τlU(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlU(X
1
T (τl))
)]
l=L
E[U(XT )] =
∫
R+
E
[
pT (l)
(
1T<τlU(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlU(X
1
T (τl))
)]
PL(dl)
where for l > 0, τl := inf{t : Λt ≥ l}.
Proof: We will use the change of probability to PL in order to reduce to the case where L and
FT are independent. Firstly, by (3.11),
E[U(XT )|G
M
0 ] = E
[
1T<τU(X
0
T (L)) + 1T≥τU(X
1
T (τ)) |L
]
= EPL
[
pT (l)
(
1T<τlU(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlU(X
1
T (τl))
) ]
l=L
= E
[
pT (l)
(
1T<τlU(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlU(X
1
T (τl))
) ]
l=L
where the last two equalities follow respectively from the facts that F∞ and σ(L) are independent
under PL and that PL is identical to P on FT . Thus
E[U(XT )] = E
[
E
[
1T<τU(X
0
T (L)) + 1T≥τU(X
1
T (τ)) |L
]]
=
∫
R+
E
[
pT (l)
(
1T<τlU(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlU(X
1
T (τl))
) ]
PL(dl).
✷
This motivates to introduce, for any l > 0, the set Al of pairs pi = (pi
0, pi1(·)), where pi0 and
pi1(·) are respectively F-predictable and P(F) ⊗ B(R+)-measurable processes, such that
(3.15)
∫ τl∧T
0
|pi0t σ
0
t |
2dt+
∫ T
τl∧T
|pi1t (τl)σ
1
t (τl)|
2dt <∞ and pi0τlγτl < 1, a.s.
and consider the following optimization problem
(3.16) V0(l) = sup
pi∈Al
E
[
pT (l)
(
1T<τlU(X
0
T ) + 1T≥τlU(X
1
T (τl))
)]
,
where τl is the F-stopping time inf{t ≥ 0 : Λt ≥ l}.
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3.3 The necessity of limiting short selling for the insider before default
In this subsection, we show that if the regulators do not impose any constraint on short selling
for the insider before the default of the counterparty, then the insider can achieve a terminal
wealth that is not bounded in L1.
Proposition 3.3 We suppose that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) the process Λ is a.s. strictly increasing on [0, T ],
(2) for any l in the support of the distribution of the law of L, one has P(ΛT ≥ l) > 0.
Then we have
ess sup
pi∈AL
E[XT | G
M
0 ] = +∞ a.s.
In addition, for any utility function U such that lim
x→+∞
U(x) = +∞,
ess sup
pi∈AL
E[U(XT ) | G
M
0 ] = +∞ a.s.
Proof: Let ϕ : ]0,+∞[→ ]0,+∞[ be an increasing function such that ϕ(l) < l for any
l ∈ ]0,+∞[. Let ψ > 0 be a constant. For each l ∈ ]0,+∞[, we define a strategy pi(l) =
(pi0(l), pi1(·)) ∈ Al as follows
pi0t (l) = −ψ1τϕ(l)<t, pi
1(·) ≡ 0.
Note that (pi0(·), pi1(·)) is an admissible strategy in AL. The value at the time τl of the cor-
responding wealth process Xϕ,ψ(l) is equal to (1 + γτlψ)X
ϕ,ψ
τ−l
. By the dynamics of the wealth
process (3.6) and (3.7), on {τl ≤ T}, we have
Xϕ,ψτl = X0(1 + γτlψ) exp
(
−
∫ τl
τϕ(l)
(
µ0tψ +
1
2
(σ0t )
2ψ2
)
dt−
∫ τl
τϕ(l)
σ0tψdWt
)
.
Moreover,
E[XT |G
M
0 ] = E
[
pT (l)
(
1T<τlX
0
T (l) + 1T≥τlX
1
T (τl)
)]
l=L
≥ E
[
1T≥τlpT (l)X
ϕ,ψ
τl
]
l=L
Now fix an increasing sequence (ϕn)n≥1 of functions such that ϕn(l) < l for l ∈]0,∞[ and that
limn→+∞ ϕn(l) = l. By the condition (1), one obtains that τϕn(l) converges a.s. to τl when
n→ +∞. The sequence of random variables
∫ τl∧T
τϕn(l)∧T
σ0tψ dWt, n ≥ 1 converges a.s. to 0. Then
by Fatou’s lemma
lim inf
n→+∞
E[1T≥τlpT (l)X
ϕn,ψ
τl
] > E[1T≥τlpT (l)X0(1 + γτlψ)]
which implies the first assertion since P(τl ≤ T ) > 0 by condition (2). We use the similar
argument and the assumption on U to obtain
lim
ψ→+∞
E[1T≥τlpT (l)U(X0(1 + γτlψ))]l=L =∞.
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Remark 3.4 The strategies mentionned in this proof are not arbitrage strategies because for
any fixed function ϕ as in the proof, P(T ∈ [[τϕ(L), τ [[) > 0 and on this event, the strategy of the
insider that consists of betting on the default before maturity T turns out to be a wrong bet.
Thus, on a non null probability set, the strategy of a standard investor outperforms the one of
the insiders, although the converse inequality holds on expectation.
Proposition 3.3 justifies to consider, instead of AL defined in (3.8), the following admissible
trading strategy sets for the insider : for all δ ≥ 0,
AδL = {(pi
0(·), pi1(·)) ∈ AL such that pi
0 ≥ −δ}(3.17)
and to quantify the impact of the lower bound δ. Similar to (3.15), we define
Aδl = {(pi
0, pi1(·)) ∈ Al such that pi
0 ≥ −δ}.
Before considering the main optimization problem
(3.18) ess sup
pi∈AδL
E[U(XT ) | G
M
0 ]
we first consider an alternative family of optimization problems depending on the parameter
l ∈ ]0,+∞[,
(3.19) V δ0 (l) := sup
pi∈Aδl
E
[
pT (l)
(
1T<τlU(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlU(X
1
T (τl))
)]
.
The following theorem shows that the optimal value of the optimization problem (3.18) is actu-
ally equal to V δ0 (L).
Theorem 3.5 With the above notation, we have
V δ0 (L) = ess sup
pi∈AδL
E[U(XT ) | G
M
0 ] a.s.
Proof: Assume that (pi0(·), pi1(·)) is an element inAδL, then (pi
0(l), pi1(·)) ∈ Aδl . By Proposition
3.2 we obtain that
ess sup
pi∈AδL
E[U(XT ) | G
M
0 ] ≤ V
δ
0 (L).
For the converse inequality, we shall use measurable selection theorem. For any ε > 0 and any
l ∈ ]0,∞[, let Fε(l) be the set of strategies (pi
0, pi1(·)) ∈ Aδl which are ε-optimal with respect to
the problem (3.19), namely such that
E
[
pT (l)
(
1T<τlU(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlU(X
1
T (τl))
)]
≥
{
V δ0 (l)− ε, if V
δ
0 (l) < +∞,
1/ε, if V δ0 (l) = +∞.
By a measurable selection theorem (cf. Benes [3, Lemma 1]), there exists a measurable (with
respect to l) family {(pi0(l), pi1(·, l))}l∈R+ such that (pi
0(l), pi1(·, l)) ∈ Fε(l) for any l > 0. Finally
let
pi0(·) := pi0(·), pi1t (x) := 1t>xpi
1
t (x,Λx).
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We have (pi0(·), pi1(·)) ∈ AL and pi
1
t (τl) = pi
1
t (τl, l) for any l > 0 on {τl < t}. Therefore, by
Proposition 3.2,
E[U(X˜T ) | G
M
0 ] = E
[
pT (l)
(
1T<τlU(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlU(X
1
T (τl))
)]
l=L
≥
{
V δ0 (L)− ε, if V
δ
0 (L) < +∞,
1/ε, if V δ0 (L) = +∞.
Since ε is arbitrary, we obtain E[U(X˜T ) | G
M
0 ] ≥ V
δ
0 (L). ✷
4 Solving the optimization problems
In this section, we concentrate on solving the optimization problem (3.19)
sup
pi∈Aδ
l
E
[
pT (l)
(
1T<τlU(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlU(X
1
T (τl))
)]
for any fixed l > 0. We recall that the before-default and after-default wealth processes X0
and X1 are governed by two control processes pi0 and pi1 respectively, so we need to search for
a couple of optimal controls pˆi = (pˆi0, pˆi1). In Theorem 4.1 we explain how to decompose the
optimization problem into two problems each depending only on pi0 and on pi1 respectively.
The after-default optimization problem will be solved firstly, using the after-default filtration F1
F
1 := (Fτl∨t)t∈[0,T ].
Remark that the initial σ-field of the filtration F1 is not trivial :
F10 = Fτl = {A ∈ A : A ∩ {τl ≤ t} ∈ Ft, t ∈ [0, T ]}
and τl is Fτl-measurable. All the F
1-adapted processes involved in the after-default optimization
problem are indexed on the right-upper side by the symbol “1”. In particular, we denote by
X1,xl(τl) the solution of the SDE (3.7) defined on the stochastic interval [[τl, T ]] starting from
the F-stopping time τl with Fτl-measurable initial value xl. We define by A
1
l the admissible
predictable strategy set (pi1t (τl), t ∈ ]]τl, T ]]) such that
∫ τl∨T
τl
|pi1t (τl)σ
1
t (τl)|
2dt <∞ a.s..
The global before default optimization problem involves the solution of the after-default opti-
mization problem and will be solved in a second step, using the stopped filtration F0
F
0 := (Fτl∧t)t∈[0,T ].
All the F0-adapted processes involved in the after-default optimization problem are indexed
on the right-upper side by the symbol “0”. The admissible predictable strategy set A0,δl is
(pi0t (l), t ∈ [[0, τl ∧ T ]]) such that
∫ τl∧T
0 |pi
0
t (l)σ
0
t |
2dt <∞, pi0t (l) ≥ −δ and 1 > pi
0
τl
(l)γτl , a.s..
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Theorem 4.1 For any l > 0, we denote by V 1τl(xl) the optimal value of the after-default opti-
mization problem
(4.1) V 1τl(xl) = ess sup
pi1(τl)∈A
1
l
E[pT (l)U(X
1,xl
T (τl))|Fτl ],
then the global optimal value V δ0 (l) defined in (3.19) can be written as the solution of a before-
default optimization problem as
(4.2) V δ0 (l) = sup
pi0∈A
0,δ
l
E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlV
1
τl
(
X0τl(l)(1 − pi
0
τl
(l)γτl)
)]
.
Proof: Consider firstly an arbitrary admissible strategy (pi0, pi1(·)) ∈ Aδl for a fixed l > 0.
By definition, (pi0t , t ∈ [[0, τl ∧ T ]]) ∈ A
0,δ
l and (pi
1
t (τl), t ∈ ]]τl, T ]]) ∈ A
1
l . Taking the conditional
expectation with respect to Fτl leads to the following inequalities
E
[
pT (l)
(
1T<τlU(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlU(X
1
T (τl))
)]
= E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlE
(
pT (l)U(X
1
T (τl))|Fτl
)]
≤ E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlV
1
τl
(X0τl(l)(1 − pi
0
τl
(l)γτl))
]
≤ V δ0 (l).
For the converse inequality, let us assume for the moment that the esssup in the definition
(4.1) is achieved for a given pˆi1(τl) (see section 4.1 for the proof). Then for any (pi
0
t , t ∈ [[0, τl]]) in
A0,δl , by a measurable selection theorem, there exists a P(F)⊗B(R+)-measurable process pi
1(·)
such that pi1(τl) = pˆi
1(τl) on ]]τl, T ]] and that (pi
0, pi1(·)) ∈ A
δ
l , where we have extended pi
0 to an
F-predictable process on R+. Thus
V δ0 (l) ≥ E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlV
1
τl
(X0τl(l)(1 − pi
0
τl
(l)γτl))
]
By taking the supremum over all (pi0t (l), t ∈ [[0, τl]]) ∈ A
0,δ
l , we obtain the desired inequality. ✷
Remark 4.2 The supremum in V δ0 (l) can be approached by a sequence of admissible strategies
in A0,δl (see Proposition 4.12), which induces a sequence of strategies in A
δ
L such that the cor-
responding value functions converge to V δ0 := suppi∈AδL
E[U(XT )]. Thus V
δ
0 =
∫
R+
V δ0 (l)P
L(dl).
Remark 4.3 The process (pt(l), t ∈ [0, T ]) is essential in our approach of initial information
and plays a similar role to the default density process in [14] (αt(θ), t ∈ [0, T ]) defined as
αt(θ)dθ = P(τ ∈ dθ|Ft). Thus, to quantify the gain of the insider (as in the forthcoming
Proposition 4.5), it is interesting to compare those two processes.
• In the particular case where the Ft-conditional law of L admits a density gt(l) w.r.t. the
Lebesgue measure, the default density can be completely deduced (see [6, Proposition 3])
in this framework as αt(θ) = λθgt(Λθ), t ≥ θ and αt(θ) = E[αθ(θ)|Ft], t ≤ θ where λ is the
process given in Section 2.
• In the general case, the law of L can have atoms, then the default density does not exist
and the approach in [14] is no longer valid, whereas the insider’s optimization problem can
be solved with the process p.(l).
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4.1 The after-default optimization
In this section, we focus on the after default optimization problem (4.1) in the filtration F1 =
(Fτl∨t)t∈[0,T ]
V 1τl(xl) = ess sup
pi1(τl)∈A
1
l
E[pT (l)U(X
1,xl
T (τl))|Fτl ]
where τl is an F-stopping time and the initial wealth xl is Fτl-measurable. This problem is
similar to a standard optimization problem, we will extend the results in our framework where
the initial time τl is a random time (and is an F-stopping time). We define the process
Zt(τl) = exp
(
−
∫ τl∨t
τl
µ1u(τl)
σ1u(τl)
dWu −
1
2
∫ τl∨t
τl
∣∣∣∣µ1u(τl)σ1u(τl)
∣∣∣∣2 du), t ∈ [0, T ].
This process is an F1-local martingale (cf. [15, page 20]), we assume that the coefficients µ1(τl)
and σ1(τl) satisfy a Novikov criterion (see Theorem 4.4 below) so that (Zt(τl))t∈[0,T ] is an F
1-
martingale.
Theorem 4.4 We assume that for any l ≥ 0, the coefficients µ1u(τl) and σ
1
u(τl) satisfy the
Novikov criterion
E
[
exp
(
1
2
∫ τl∨T
τl
∣∣∣∣µ1u(τl)σ1u(τl)
∣∣∣∣2 du)] <∞.
Then the value function process to problem (4.1) is a.s. finite and is given by
(4.3) Vˆ 1τl(xl) = E
[
pT (l)U
(
I
(
yˆτl(xl)
ZT (τl)
pT (l)
)) ∣∣∣∣F10]
where I = (U ′)−1 and the Lagrange multiplier yˆτl(·) is the unique Fτl ⊗ B(R+)-measurable
solution of the equation
1
Zt(τl)
E
[
ZT (τl)I
(
yˆτl(xl)
ZT (τl)
pT (l)
) ∣∣∣∣F10] = xl.
The corresponding optimal wealth is equal to
(4.4) Xˆ1,xlt (τl) =
1
Zt(τl)
E
[
ZT (τl)I
(
yˆτl(xl)
ZT (τl)
pT (l)
) ∣∣∣∣F1t ] , t ∈ [[τl, T ]].
Proof: Note that after the default, the market is complete. The process Z(τl)X
1,xl(τl) is
a positive local F1-martingale, and thus a supermartingale, leading to the following budget
constraint :
(4.5) E
(
ZT (τl)X
1,xl
T (τl)
∣∣∣F10) ≤ xl.
Conversely, the martingale representation theorem on the brownian filtration implies that for
any FT ⊗ B(R+)-measurable XT (·), there exists a P(F)⊗ B(R+)- measurable process φ(·) such
that
XT (τl)1τl<T = E(XT (τl)1τl<T |Fτl) +
∫ τl∨T
τl
φu(τl)du
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Therefore the after default optimization problem is solved by the mean of the Lagrange multiplier
V 1τl(xl) = E
[
pT (l)U
(
I
(
yˆτl(xl)
ZT (τl)
pT (l)
))
|F10
]
and the optimal wealth is given by
Xˆ1,xlt (τl) =
1
Zt(τl)
E
[
ZT (τl)I
(
yˆτl(xl)
ZT (τl)
pT (l)
)
|F1t
]
where I = (U ′)−1 and the Lagrange multiplier yˆτl(xl) is Fτl ⊗ B(R+)-measurable and satisfies
Xˆ1,xlτl (τl) = xl. The existence, uniqueness and measurability of the Lagrange multiplier yˆτl(xl)
in the case of a non trivial initial σ-field is proved in Proposition 4.5 of Hillairet [8]. ✷
We can already give a first analytical comparison of the value function process of the after
default optimization problem between the initial information and the progressive information.
We recall (see [14, Theorem 4.1]) that for the progressive information, this value function process
at the default time θ = τl is
V¯ 1τl(x) = E
[
αT (τl)U
(
I
(
y¯τl(x)
ZT (τl)
αT (τl)
)) ∣∣∣∣Fτl](4.6)
with yτl such that E
[
ZT (τl)
Zt(τl)
I
(
y¯τl(x)
ZT (τl)
αT (τl)
) ∣∣∣∣Fτl] = x
which can be compared to the value function (4.3) for an initial information. To do this, we
assume that the Ft-conditional law of L admits a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure,
denoted as gt(l) (see Remark 4.3). Using Assumption 3.1, it is sufficient to assume that the law
of L admits a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Proposition 4.5 The value function processes of the after-default optimization problem for the
initial information Vˆ 1τl(x) and for the progressive information V¯
1
τl
(x) satisfy
V¯ 1τl(x)
Vˆ 1τl(x)
= g0(l)λτl
where g0(.) denotes the density of the law of L with respect to the Lebesgue measure and is
supposed to be strictly positive. In addition, the ratio αT (τl)
pT (l)
is Fτl-measurable and is also equal
to
V¯ 1τl
(x)
Vˆ 1τl
(x)
.
Proof: On the stochastic interval [[τl, T ]], the density of probability Zt(τl) is the same for the
initial and the progressive information, but not necessarily the Lagrange multipliers, although
they satisfy the same type of equation. More precisely, y¯τl(x) is the unique Fτl ⊗ B(R+)-
measurable solution of
(4.7) E
[
ZT (τl)
Zt(τl)
I
(
y¯τl(x)
ZT (τl)
αT (τl)
)
|Fτl
]
= x
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and yˆτl(x) is the unique Fτl ⊗ B(R+)-measurable solution of
(4.8) E
[
ZT (τl)
Zt(τl)
I
(
yˆτl(x)
ZT (τl)
pT (l)
)
|Fτl
]
= x.
We recall that gT (l) is the density of the FT -conditional law of L with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. According to (3.12) and Remark 4.3, pT (l) =
gT (l)
g0(l)
and αT (τl) = λτlgT (Λτl) = λτlgT (l).
Thus the ratio αT (τl)
pT (l)
= λτlg0(l) is Fτl-measurable. Furthermore, (4.7) is equivalent to
E
[
ZT (τl)
Zt(τl)
I
(
y¯τl(x)
pT (l)
αT (τl)
ZT (τl)
pT (l)
)
|Fτl
]
= x
so the unicity of the Fτl-measurable solution of the equation (4.8) implies that the y¯τl(x)
pT (l)
αT (τ)
=
yˆτ (x). Therefore,
y¯τl(x)
yˆτl(x)
= λτlg0(l) and U
(
I
(
y¯τl(x)
ZT (τl)
αT (τl)
))
= U
(
I
(
yˆτl(x)
ZT (τl)
pT (l)
))
. We conclude
the proof by using again that the ratio αT (τl)
pT (l)
= λτlg0(l) is Fτl-measurable. ✷
Remark 4.6 1. The constant 1
g0(l)
is a threshold to compare with λτl . For a given scenario,
if λτl is smaller than
1
g0(l)
, which is often the case in practice, then the absolute value of
the value function for the initial information is greater than the one for the progressive
information. In this case, the insider puts a higher weight pT (l) on the after-default
optimization problem (4.1), compared to a standard investor whose weight is αT (τl). This
means that pt(l) conveys more information than αt(τl). Moreover, the smaller g0(l) is,
the greater is the gain of an insider. The interpretation is as follows: small value of g0(l)
means that P(L ∈ dl) is small, thus the insider, who knows the real value of L, has very
relevant information.
2. Concerning the optimal wealth Xˆ1(τl) in (4.4), we can prove, using the same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 4.5 that starting from a same wealth xl at the default time
τl, the optimal wealth process of the after-default optimization problem is the same for
the initial and the progressive information, i.e. Xˆ1,xl(τl) = X¯
1,xl(τl). This result is not
surprising, since after the default, the two information flows coincide. But naturally the
input wealth of the after-default optimization problem will not be the same for the two
information flows since they are not the same before τl.
We will quantify numerically the gain of an insider compared to a standard investor for the
global optimization problem. We now consider, as in [14], Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA) utility functions
U(x) =
xp
p
, 0 < p < 1, x > 0
and I(x) = x
1
p−1 . Direct computations from the previous theorem yield the optimal wealth
Xˆ1,xlt (τl) =
xl
Zt(τl)
E
[
pT (l)
(
ZT (τl)
pT (l)
) p
p−1
∣∣∣F1t ]
E
[
pT (l)
(
ZT (τl)
pT (l)
) p
p−1
∣∣∣Fτl] , t ∈ [[τl, T ]]
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and the optimal value function
(4.9) Vˆ 1τl(xl) =
xpl
p
(
E
[
pT (l)
(
ZT (τl)
pT (l)
) p
p−1
∣∣∣∣Fτl
])1−p
=:
xpl
p
Kτl
where the Fτl-measurable random variable Kτl =
(
E
[
pT (l)
(
ZT (τl)
pT (l)
) p
p−1
∣∣∣∣Fτl])1−p only de-
pends on the stopping time τl and on market parameters.
4.2 The before-default optimization
We now consider the optimization problem (4.2) with CRRA utility functions. Using (4.9), we
have to solve :
(4.10) V δ0 (l) = sup
pi0∈A
0,δ
l
E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlKτlU
(
X0τl(l)(1 − pi
0
τl
(l)γτl)
)]
where the Fτl-measurable random variableKτl does not depend on the control process pi
0 ∈ A0,δl .
We will use a dynamic programming approach. Recall that F0 = (Fτl∧t)t∈[0,T ] is the stopped
filtration at the default time. Since 1t<τl is Fτl∧t-measurable, we have
E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlKτlU
(
X0τl(l)(1− pi
0
τl
(l)γτl)
)
|Fτl∧t
]
= 1t≥τlKτlU
(
X0τl(l)(1 − pi
0
τl
(l)γτl)
)
+ E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
0
T (l)) + 1t<τl≤TKτlU
(
X0τl(l)(1 − pi
0
τl
(l)γτl)
)
|Fτl∧t
]
For any ν ∈ A0,δl , we introduce the family of F
0-adapted processes
(4.11) Xt(ν) := ess sup
pi0∈A
0,δ
l
(t,ν)
E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
0
T (l)) + 1t<τl≤TKτlU
(
X0τl(l)(1 − pi
0
τl
(l)γτl)
)
|Fτl∧t
]
where A0,δl (t, ν) is the set of controls coinciding with ν until time t: for any t ∈ [0, T ], ν ∈ A
0,δ
l ,
A0,δl (t, ν) = {pi
0 ∈ A0,δl : pi
0
.∧t = ν.∧t}, X
ν,0 denotes the wealth process derived from the control
ν ∈ A0,δl . We have V
δ
0 (l) = X0(ν) for any ν ∈ A
0,δ
l .
In the following result, we show that the short selling constraint plays a crucial role in the
optimization. In fact, it is the optimal strategy at the default time.
Proposition 4.7 For any pi0 ∈ A0,δl , there exists a sequence of strategies (pi
0
n ∈ A
0,δ
l )n∈N∗ such
that pi0n,τl = −δ and
lim
n→+∞
X0(pi
0
n) ≥ X0(pi
0).
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Proof: Let (τn)n∈N∗ where τn < τl be an increasing sequence of F-stopping times that converge
to τl. Starting from a strategy pi
0 ∈ A0,δl , we define another strategy pi
0
n = 1[[0,τn]]pi
0 − 1]]τn,τl]]δ
that remains in A0,δl . We denote as X
0(l) and X0n(l) the corresponding wealth before-default,
and as X0(pi
0) and X0(pi
0
n) the corresponding value function for those strategies of the before
default global optimization problem. On the one hand, by dominated convergence theorem, it
is easy to check that
lim
n→+∞
E
[
1T<τlpT (l)|U(X
0
T (l))− U(X
0
n,T (l))|
]
= 0.
On the other hand, on the event {T ≥ τl}
X0
n,τl
(l)(1− pi0
n,τl
(l)γτl)
X0
τl
(l)(1− pi0
τl
(l)γτl)
=
(1 + δγτl)
(1− pi0
τl
(l)γτl)
exp
(∫
τl
τn
(−(pi0
s
+ δ)µ0
s
+
1
2
(σ0
s
)2((pi0
s
)2 − δ2))ds−
∫
τl
τn
(pi0
s
+ δ)σ0
s
dWs
)
pi0 ∈ A0,δl implies that pi
0
τl
(l) ≥ −δ and
(1+δγτl )
(1−pi0τl
(l)γτl )
≥ 1 (because γ > 0). τn → τl implies that
the exponential term tends to 1 a.s. Thus limn→+∞
X0n,τl
(l)(1−pi0n,τl
(l)γτl )
X0τl
(l)(1−pi0τl
(l)γτl )
≥ 1 and
lim
n→+∞
E
[
1T≥τlKτlU(X
0
n,τl
(l)(1 − pi0n,τl(l)γτl))
]
≥ E
[
1T≥τlKτlU(X
0
τl
(l)(1 − pi0τl(l)γτl))
]
.
Consequently,
lim
n→+∞
X0(pi
0
n) ≥ X0(pi
0).
✷
We now characterize the optimal strategy process. From the dynamic programming principle,
the following result holds:
Lemma 4.8 For any ν ∈ A0,δl , the process
ξνt := Xt(ν) + 1t≥τlKτlU(X
ν,0
τl
(l)(1 − ντl(l)γτl)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T
is an F0-supermartingale. Furthermore, the optimal strategy pi0 is characterized by the martin-
gale property : (ξpi
0
t )0≤t≤T is an F
0-martingale.
Proof: Let s, t be two times such that s ≤ t ≤ T .
E
[
Xt(ν) + 1t≥τlKτlU(X
ν,0
τl
(l)(1− ντl(l)γτl))|Fτl∧s
]
= E
[
Xt(ν) + 1s<τl≤tKτlU(X
ν,0
τl
(l)(1− ντl(l)γτl))|Fτl∧s
]
+ 1s≥τlKτlU(X
ν,0
τl
(l)(1 − ντl(l)γτl))
17
We make explicit the conditional expectation :
E
[
Xt(ν) + 1s<τl≤tKτlU(X
ν,0
τl
(l)(1 − ντl(l)γτl))|Fτl∧s
]
= E
[
ess sup
pi0∈A
0,δ
l (t,ν)
E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
0
T (l)) + 1t<τl≤TKτlU(X
0
τl
(l)(1 − pi0τl(l)γτl))|Fτl∧t
]
+ 1s<τl≤tKτlU(X
ν,0
τl
(l)(1− ντl(l)γτl))|Fτl∧s
]
≤ ess sup
pi0∈A
0,δ
l
(s,ν)
E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
0
T (l)) + 1s<τl≤TKτlU(X
0
τl
(l)(1 − pi0τl(l)γτl))|Fτl∧s
]
(4.12)
the last inequality following from the fact that in the last esssup, the optimal control is taken
from the date s ≤ t. Thus
E
[
Xt(ν) + 1t≥τlKτlU(X
ν,0
τl
(l)(1− ντl(l)γτl))|Fτl∧s
]
≤ Xs(µ) + 1s≥τlKτlU(X
ν,0
τl
(l)(1− ντl(l)γτl))
and (ξνt )0≤t≤T is an F
0-supermartingale. It is an F0-martingale if and only if the inequality
(4.12) is an equality for all t ∈ [0, T ], meaning that ν is the optimal control on [0, t], for all
t ≤ T . This characterizes the optimal strategy. ✷
Remark that the F0-adapted process
Yt :=
Xt(ν)
U(Xν,0t (l))
(4.13)
= ess sup
pi0∈A
0,δ
l (t,ν)
E
[
1T<τlpT (l)
( X0T (l)
Xν,0t (l)
)p
+ 1t<τl≤TKτl
( X0τl(l)
Xν,0t (l)
)p
(1− pi0τl(l)γτl)|Fτl∧t
]
0 ≤ t ≤ T
does not depend on ν ∈ A0,δl , and is constant after τl. We will give a characterization of the
process Y in terms of a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) and of the optimal
strategy. Before this, we give a characterization of F0-martingale.
Lemma 4.9 Let (Mt)t∈[0,T ] be an F
0-martingale. Then there exists an F-predictable process φ
in L2loc(W ) such that Mt =M0 +
∫ t
0 φs1s≤τldWs, t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof: We first prove that (Mt)t∈[0,T ] is also an F-martingale. Indeed, for s ≤ t ≤ T
Ms = E(Mt|Fτl∧s) = E(E(Mt|Fτl)|Fs) = E(Mt|Fs)
because Mt is Fτl-measurable. Thus, by representation theorem for the F-martingale, and
since (Mt)t∈[0,T ] is stopped at time τl, there exists φ an F-predictable process such that Mt =
M0 +
∫ t
0 φs1s≤τldWs. ✷
We are now ready to characterize the optimal strategy. Remark that Yt =
Xt(µ)
U(Xν,0t (l))
is positive
on [[0, τl[[ (and zero after τl) thus Y ∈ L
+
l (F
0) where
L+l (F
0) := {Y˜ : F0-adapted processes s.t. Y˜t > 0 for t ∈ [[0, τl[[ and Y˜t = 0 for t ∈ [[τl,∞[[ }.
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Theorem 4.10 The process Y defined in (4.13) is the smallest solution in L+l (F
0) to the BSDE
(4.14)
Yt = 1T<τlpT (l) + 1t<τl≤TKτl
(1 + δγτl)
p
p
+
∫ T∧τl
t
f(θ, Yθ, φθ)dθ−
∫ T∧τl
t
φθdWθ, t ∈ [[0, T ∧ τl]],
for some φ ∈ L2loc(W ), and where
(4.15) f(s, Ys, φs) = p ess sup
ν∈A
0,δ
l
,s.t. ντl=−δ
[(
µ0sYs + σ
0
sφs)νs −
1− p
2
Ys|νsσ
0
s |
2
]
Remark 4.11 As in Theorem 4.2 in [14], the optimal strategy before default is characterized
through the optimization of the driver of a BSDE. However, the main difference relies in the
fact that in our case, the driver has a jump at the default time τl. Nevertheless, since the jump
occurs (if it occurs) only at the terminal date of the BSDE, standard theory on BSDE still apply.
Proof: By Lemma 4.8, for any ν ∈ A0,δl
ξνt = U(X
ν,0
t (l))Yt + 1t≥τlKτlU(X
ν,0
τl
(l)(1 − ντl(l)γτl) 0 ≤ t ≤ T
is an F0-supermartingale. In particular, by taking ν = 0, we see that the processes (Yt +
Kτl1t≥τl)0≤t≤T , and thus (Yt)0≤t≤T are F
0-supermartingales. By the Doob-Meyer decomposition
and Lemma 4.9, there exists φ ∈ L2loc(W ), and a finite variation increasing F
0-predictable process
A such that:
(4.16) dYt = φtdWt − dAt, t ∈ [[0, T ∧ τl]].
From Itoˆ’s formula, we deduce that the finite variation process in the decomposition of the
F
0-supermartingale ξν , ν ∈ A0,δl , is given by −A
ν with
dAνt = (X
ν,0
t (l))
p
{1
p
dAt − (µ
0
tYt + σ
0
t φt1t≤τl)νtdt−
1− p
2
Yt|νtσ
0
t |
2dt−Kt
(1− νtγt)
p
p
d1t≥τl
}
.
Aν is nondecreasing and the martingale property of ξpˆi
0
implies that
dAt = p
[
(µ0tYt + σ
0
t φt1t≤τl))pˆi
0
t dt−
1− p
2
Yt|pˆi
0
t σ
0
t |
2dt+Kt
(1− pˆi0t γt)
p
p
d1t≥τl
]
and
At = A0 + p ess sup
ν∈A
0,δ
l
[ ∫ t
0
(
(µ0sYs + σ
0
sφs)νs −
1− p
2
Ys|νsσ
0
s |
2
)
ds+ 1t≥τlKτl
(1 − ντlγτl)
p
p
]
.
Maximizing at τl leads to ντl = −δ (see Proposition 4.7) and
At = A0 + p ess sup
ν∈A
0,δ
l
s.t. ντl=−δ
[ ∫ t
0
(
µ0sYs + σ
0
sφs)νs −
1− p
2
Ys|νsσ
0
s |
2
)
ds
]
+ 1t≥τlKτl
(1 + δγτl)
p
p
.
Furthermore, YT = 1T<τlpT (l) and (Yt)0≤t≤T is constant after τl , thus (Y, φ) solves the BSDE
(4.14). Note that Y is not a continuous process, it may jump at time τl.
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We now prove that Y is smallest solution in the L+l (F
0) to the BSDE (4.14). Let Y˜ ∈ L+l (F
0)
be another solution, and we define the family of nonnegative F0-adapted processes ξ˜ν(Y˜ ), ν ∈
A0,δl , as
ξνt (Y˜ ) = U(X
ν,0
t (l))Y˜t + 1t≥τlKτlU(X
ν,0
τl
(l)(1 − ντl(l)γτl)), t ∈ [0, T ].
By similar calculations as above, dξνt (Y˜ ) = dM˜
ν
t −dA˜
ν
t , where A˜
ν is a nondecreasing F0-adapted
process, and M˜ν is a F0- local martingale. By Fatou’s lemma, this implies that the process
ξν(Y˜ ) is a F0-supermartingale, for any ν ∈ A0,δl . Since Y˜T = 1T<τlpT (l), we deduce that for all
ν ∈ A0,δl
E
[
U(Xν,0T )1T<τlpT (l) + 1t≥τlKτlU(X
ν,0
τl
(l)(1 − ντl(l)γτl)
∣∣∣F0t ] ≤ U(Xν,0t )Y˜t, t ∈ [0, T ].
Since p > 0, U(Xν,0t ) is positive. By dividing the above inequalities by U(X
ν,0
t ), we deduce by
definition of Y (see (4.13)), and arbitrariness of ν ∈ A0,δl , that Yt ≤ Y˜t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . This shows
that Y is the smallest solution to the BSDE (4.14). ✷
For optimizing (4.13) via the BSDE (4.14), a naive approach will consist in optimizing pi0 at
time τl, leading to an pi
0
τl
= −δ, and then optimizing for s < τl the driver
f0(s, Y 0s , φ
0
s) = ess sup
νs≥−δ
p[
(
µ0sY
0
s + σ
0
sφ
0
s)νs −
1− p
2
Y 0s |νsσ
0
s |
2]
where Y 0 is solution to the BSDE
Y 0t = 1T<τlpT (l)+1t<τl≤TKτl
(1 + δγτl)
p
p
+
∫ T∧τl
t
f0(θ, Y 0θ , φ
0
θ)dθ−
∫ T∧τl
t
φ0θdWθ, t ∈ [[0, T ∧τl]],
leading to the optimal portfolio pˆi0s . Thus, the natural candidate to be the optimal strategy
before default is
(4.17) pinp := 1[[0,τl[[pˆi
0 − δ1τl ,
but unfortunately pinp is not a predictable process. Nevertheless, we will prove the existence of a
sequence of predictable strategies in A0,δl such that the corresponding value function tends to the
value function relative to this non predictable strategy. To do this, for any strategy pi0 ∈ A0,δl ,
we recall the corresponding value function of the before default global optimization problem
(4.18) X0(pi
0) = E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
pi0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlKτlU(X
pi0
τl
(l)(1 − pi0τl(l)γτl))
]
.
Note that (4.18) can also be defined for a strategy pi that is predictable only on [[0, τl[[ (and not
necessarly on [[0, τl]]). Using Proposition 4.7, we have the following result:
Proposition 4.12 The strategies (pi0n = 1[[0,τn]]pˆi
0− 1]]τn,τl]]δ) where pˆi
0 is the optimal process for
the driver of the BSDE
Y 0t = 1T<τlpT (l)+1t<τl≤TKτl
(1 + δγτl)
p
p
+
∫ T∧τl
t
f0(θ, Y 0θ , φ
0
θ)dθ−
∫ T∧τl
t
φ0θdWθ, t ∈ [[0, T ∧τl[[,
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f0(s, y, φ) = p sup
ν≥−δ
[(
µ0sy + σ
0
sφ)ν −
1− p
2
y|νσ0s |
2
]
are in A0,δl and satisfy
lim
n→+∞
X0(pi
0
n) = V (l) = E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
pˆi0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlKτlU(X
pˆi0
τl
(l)(1 + δγτl))
]
.
Proof: Let (τn)n∈N∗ be an increasing sequence of F-predictable stopping times that converge
to τl. For any integer n ≥ 1, the strategy pi
0
n := 1[[0,τn]]pˆi
0 − 1]]τn,τl]]δ is in A
0,δ
l and pi
0
n converges
to the non-predictable optimal strategy pinp defined in (4.17) when n → ∞. Moreover, for any
n ∈ N∗, X0(pi
0
n) ≤ X0(pi
np) and by Proposition 4.7
X0(pi
np) ≥ lim
n→+∞
X0(pi
0
n) ≥ V (pˆi
0).
But the proof of Proposition 4.7 still holds if we change the value at time τl of the portfolio pi
0,
thus the converse inequality X0(pi
np) ≤ limn→+∞X0(pi
0
n) holds and
E
[
1T<τlpT (l)U(X
pˆi0
T (l)) + 1T≥τlKτlU(X
pˆi0
τl
(l)(1 + δγτl))
]
= X0(pi
np) = X0(1[[0,τl[[pˆi
0 − δ1τl)
= lim
n→+∞
X0(1[[0,τn]]pˆi
0 − 1]]τn,τl]]δ)
= lim
n→+∞
X0(pi
0
n)
✷
5 Numerical illustrations
We now illustrate our previous results by explicit models and we aim to compare the optimization
results for an insider and a standard investor. We recall that all investors start with an initial
wealth X0. For the purpose of comparison, we choose a similar model with the one studied
in [14]. More precisely, we let the parameters µ0, σ0, γ to be constant, and µ1(θ), σ1(θ) are
deterministic functions of θ given by
µ1(θ) = µ0
θ
T
, σ1(θ) = σ0(2−
θ
T
), θ ∈ [0, T ],(5.1)
which means that the ratio of the after-default and before-default for the return rate of the
asset is smaller than 1 and for the volatility is larger than 1. Moreover, these ratios increase
or decrease linearly with the default time respectively: the after-default rate of return drops to
zero, when the default time occurs near the initial date, and converges to the before-default rate
of return, when the default time occurs near the finite investment horizon. For the volatility,
this ratio converges to the double (resp. initial) value of the before-default volatility, when the
default time goes to the initial (resp. terminal horizon) time. Moreover, in order to satisfy
the hypothesis in the simulation part of [14], we have to assume that the default barrier L has
no atoms (to ensure the density hypothesis, see Remark 4.3) and that L is independent of the
filtration F (so that the default density is a deterministic function). In this case, pT (L) = 1.
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Consider the CRRA utility U(x) = x
p
p
, 0 < p < 1, the after-default value function is given
from (4.9) by
V 1τl(x) = KτlU(x)
where
Kτl =
(
E[ZT (τl)
p
p−1 ]
)1−p
= exp
(
1
2
p
1− p
(µ1(τl)
σ1(τl)
)2
(τl ∨ T − τl)
)
Furthermore, the solution of the before-default optimization problem is given by
V0(l) = Y0U(X0)
where Y is the solution of the BSDE (4.14) when letting φ = 0, i.e.
(5.2) Yt = 1T<τl + 1T≥τlKτl
(1 + δγ)p
p
+
∫ τl∧T
t
f(θ, Yθ)dθ
where
f(t, y) = p ess sup
ν∈A
0,δ
l ,ντl=−δ
{µ0νt −
1− p
2
(νtσ
0)2}y.
We notice that in the case where the default time τl occurs after the maturity T , the optimal
strategy coincides with the classical Merton strategy with constraint pi ∈ [−δ, 1
γ
[. In the case
where τl occurs before T , the process Y is stopped at τl, with the terminal value depending on
the quantity Kτl , and the short-selling strategy −δ at τl. We use an iterative algorithm to solve
the equation (5.2).
The following results are based on the model parameters described below: µ0 = 0.03,
σ0 = 0.2, T = 1, the risk aversion parameter p = 0.8. For the standard investor, we use
the deterministic model as in [14] letting P(τ > t) = e−λt, λ > 0 so that the density function is
α(θ) = λe−λθ for all θ ≥ 0.
Figure 1 compares the optimal value function for insider, investor and Merton strategy. We
fix the short-selling constraint δ = 0.5, the loss given default γ = 0.2 and the default intensity
λ = 0.3. This corresponds to a relatively high risk of default. At the default time, the value
function suffers a brutal loss for all the three strategies. The insider outperforms the other two
strategies before and after the default occurs. Before the default, the value function for the
standard investor is smaller than the Merton one because the latter does not consider at all the
potential default risk. However, when the default occurs, the investor outperforms the Merton
strategy since the default risk is taken into account from the beginning.
In Figure 2, we fix a smaller short-selling constraint δ = 0.1 and we study the impact of
the loss given default γ. We observe that the value functions for both insider and investor are
increasing with respect to the loss value γ. It is interesting to emphasize this phenomenon as
a consequence of the short-selling where both insider and the investor will profit the default
event and obtain a larger value function. More precisely, in the left-hand figure, we consider
a relatively low default risk (with the default intensity λ = 0.1) and we observe that the gain
of the insider with respect to the investor remains stable in time and also for different values
of γ. Whereas in the right-hand figure with a higher default risk (λ = 0.3), the impact of γ is
more important for the investor: before the default the value function of the investor increases
more significantly as γ increases, and there is no longer a drop at the default time. This can be
explained by the fact that the investor has no limit for the short-selling strategy.
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Figure 1: Value function insider vs investor and Merton: p = 0.2, λ = 0.3 and δ = 0.5.
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Figure 3 shows what may happen in a extreme situation for the default and loss risks. For
extreme parameters of default intensity λ = 0.5 and loss value γ = 0.5, we remark that the
investor may outperform the insider, see the left-hand figure. In this situation, the investor bet
on the occurrence of the default before T and short sell a big amount of the risky asset. The
insider value function at time 0 is higher for the investor, and then decreases rapidly until the
default time : indeed, as the time goes on and the default has not occurred yet, the risk that the
bet turns out to be wrong increases, and thus the value function decreases. At the default time,
the investor makes profit of the short selling strategy, the value function being almost doubled.
The right-hand figure illustrates the wealth process of the investor on a given scenario in which
the default occurs after T despite extreme parameters for the default and loss risks (λ = 0.5 and
γ = 0.5). We observe large losses, which are induced by the wrong bet on default and extreme
short selling positions.
Finally, we study the role of the short-selling limit for different values of δ in Figure 4. Not
surprisingly, the gain of the insider is an increasing function of δ.
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Figure 2: Value function insider vs investor: δ = 0.1
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Figure 3: Extreme scenarios of default : λ = 0.5, δ = 0.1
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Figure 4: The impact of the short-selling constraint, λ = 0.3 and γ = 0.5.
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